CWIHP Bulletin nr 11 part 1 New ev

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reported to Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov against Solidarity and KOR can be led offensively and
on the activities and the situation in the PR Poland, who in how a proper relationship towards the Church could be
turn periodically has informed the General Secretary of the produced.
Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the The course and results of the 9th Plenum of the Central
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Committee of the PUWP prove, however, that these hints
Brezhnev. and suggestions that had bee previously agreed upon,
The prolongation of the exercise SOYUZ-81 came were not given the necessary attention. The 9th Plenum
explicitly as a result of the requests of comrades Jaruzelski took the decision to arrive at a stabilization of the situation
and Kania. They wanted to utilize the exercises to in the PR Poland through military means. The statements,
strengthen their position. Simultaneously they hoped to however, lacked objective conditions.
exert a positive influence on the progressive forces in There was no unity within the Politburo, although it
Poland and to show Solidarity and KOR, that the still formally existed after the 9th Plenum. The Gd�nsk party
Warsaw Pact countries are prepared to render Poland help organization demanded a report regarding the fulfillment of
all around. Thereby a certain pressure should also be the decisions of the Central Committee. Since the
exerted upon the leadership of Solidarity. decisions until then had not been fulfilled, the Party
It was of great political significance that Comrade leadership was to be dismissed due to incompetence.
Minister Hoffmann and Comrade Minister Dz�r Negative forces were to establish a new Politburo.
[Czechoslovak defense minister] participated in the joint Consequently, Politburo member and Secretary of the
exercises DRUSHBA-81 of the Soviet army and the Central Committee of the PUWP, Comrade Grabski spoke
122 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11
up, emphasizing that the Politburo should not capitulate security organs were prepared to end the counterrevolution
and he would not resign. His determined and positive at the order of the party and government leadership.
appearance brought about a turning point in the meeting of Comrade Kania did not share this opinion.
the Central Committee. The Politburo the received a vote That had generally negative consequences. The very
of confidence. There was, however, considerable criticism next day Comrade Jaruzelski also defended this view that
of the performance of the Politburo leadership. the army and security forces were not prepared for internal
One worker who came before the Plenum spoke better deployment, and that one could not rely fully upon them.
than all the leading party functionaries. He brought to This position of Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski is their
attention the fact that everyone waits for instructions from own invention. Comrade Kulikov said to Comrade
above. Since the situation in every region is different, the Jaruzelski, You have now broken off the branch upon
lower party cadres must show more initiative, and not which you sit. How will things go for you now?
constantly wait for instructions from above. Due to the view of the Polish party, state, and army
The demand was once again stated at the 9th Plenum to leadership, the subordinate generals and admirals up to
convene a party conference within a short time, to begin division commanders immediately joined their superiors in
with the electoral meetings in the local organizations, and their estimate. Even those commanders who had
to convene a meeting of the Sejm in the following days in previously affirmed to Marshal of the Soviet Union
any case. Kulikov that they and their troops would follow any order
Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov had of the party and state leadership, now swore that at once
spoken with Comrade Kania for that reason, and he had to that they could not rely upon 50 to 60 percent of their
concede that the goal of the 9th Plenum had not been soldiers and non-commissioned officers. Following the 9th
achieved. Plenum, the commander of the air-land division in
After the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee KRAKOW also advanced the view that he could only rely
Comrade Kania declared surprisingly that upon 50% of his personal forces.
the party is too weak to lead an offensive against It was also subtly brought to Comrade Marshal of the
Solidarity; Soviet Union Kulikov s attention that it could even be
many party members are organized within possible that, in the event of an invasion by other Warsaw
Solidarity , and defend its ideas; Pact troops, certain units might rebel.
an open confrontation, an open attack through the In this connection, Marshal of the Soviet Union
organs of the party, government, and instruments of force Kulikov emphasized and made clear that one could not
is not possible at this point; lead an army or make policy with sharp appearances, boot-
while it is true that there are a number of heels clicking, and a good posture, but that one rather
bridgeheads, they are, however, not sufficient for an needs a realistic evaluation of the situation and a clear
open counterattack against Solidarity and KOR. class position.
While the balance of power has changed now in The view of Comrade Jaruzelski that the Polish party
favor of Solidarity, three to four months ago it still and state leadership had won a strategic battle in
seemed to be considerably more favorable, and that it BYDGOSZCZ was also incomprehensible to Comrade
would have been good had certain offensive measures Kulikov. In order to correctly evaluate the situation, one
been conducted at this time. must understand that Comrade Kania and Comrade
Comrade Kania further stated that the Polish army in Jaruzelski are personal friends and lay down the course of
the present circumstances can only fulfill its tasks in the the party. Comrade Jaruzelski is the theoretical brain who
interior of the country with great difficulties. The organs lays the direction for the further work.
of state security would have little success fighting Regarding the health condition of Comrade
offensively either. Jaruzelski, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov called to
Until the 9th Plenum, Comrade Kania and Comrade attention the fact that he is currently stricken by the flu and
Jaruzelski had always agreed with the estimate of Marshal is physically and mentally exhausted. The estimate by the
of the Soviet Union Kulikov that the Polish Army and the Foreign Minister of the GDR, Comrade Fischer, was totally
security organs were prepared to fulfill any assignment correct, even though there were some who did not want to
given to them by the party and state leadership. admit it.
Following the 9th Plenum, however, Comrade Kania During the last conversations with Comrade [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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