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state that, when described independent of further causal consequences for
the five of removing the trolley as it was initially, would justify the lesser
evil*. I shall call such a state the structural equivalent of the justifying good
(structural equivalent for short). This is because it has the structure of
the ultimate good (the five free of threats all said and done) that justi-
fies the death of the one.21 This structural equivalent provides us with
a possible rationale for turning the trolley, for we see that the structural
equivalent of the justifying good involves something that could
170 F. M. Kamm
outweigh certain of the evils* that are effects of what we do (or that
remain despite what we do) to save the five. Which evils*? Those that
would not affect the condition of the five as it is in the structural equiv-
alent, but all those that would affect other people (like the one hit).
Still, having achieved the structural equivalent, we may not be at all
justified in turning the trolley (and hitting the one) unless we know
that the five will not die shortly anyway. So justification for turning can
depend on how the further causal consequences of turning are likely
to affect the condition of the five as it is in the structural equivalent. It
is a prerequisite of being justified in turning that there be a prospect that
the condition of the five as it is in the structural equivalent will remain, thus
becoming the greater good that all things considered justifies the lesser
evil*.22
Another causal consequence of turning the trolley is that it would
threaten the five s survival were it not that the one would be hit. Since
the stopping of the trolley by its hitting one is a matter of physical
causality, it is possible that it will not stop and all six will be killed.
Still, we could be justified in turning if it were likely to save the five,
even if the good that would ultimately justify the death of the one
does not occur. When we are justified in acting on the structural equiv-
alent, I shall say it provides an initial sufficient justification for turning;
the turning and the hit it causes are initially sufficiently justified.
 Initial refers to what exists independent of further possible causal
consequences to the five of turning;  sufficient refers to the fact that
five is a large enough number of lives saved to outweigh the death
of one.
Consider the first problem that existed independent of my action to
help and the removal of that problem, separate from the further causal
consequences for the five of my act. This provides an initial sufficient jus-
tification for acting if it involves a structural equivalent of a greater
good that ultimately (i.e., including effects of my act on the five) justi-
fies the lesser evil*. This identity connection between the structural
equivalent of the greater good and the greater good that ultimately jus-
tifies the evil* rules out a certain type of different greater good (call it
greater good (2)), which could be caused by the turning trolley, from
justifying the harm done by turning the trolley. For example, suppose
we knew that turning the trolley away from the five caused the one to
be hit and die, but we knew it did not stop the trolley looping back to
the five. However, on its way back to the five, the trolley depresses a
button that prevents another trolley from running over three different
people. Intuitively, turning the trolley should be ruled out as imper-
missible. I think what accounts for this is that there is no initial suffi-
Toward the Essence of Nonconsequentialism 171
cient justification for turning; we know that the structural equivalent
that leads to harm cannot be sustained. Turning is merely a means to
hitting the one and causing good. Here we see that although the
requirement that  the good that justifies evil* causes it is dropped,
something of it remains: the good that justifies evil* E has a structural
equivalent that either causes E or is noncausally related to what causes, or
leads to the cause of, E.23
Suppose that at least the initial sufficient justification for turning is
present. Then the hitting of the one does not produce the structural
equivalent of the good. Rather, it stands outside the structural equiva-
lent and prevents new threats to it that arise from what I have done to
rescue the five. In that sense, the evil* prevents the undoing of the good,
rather than bringing about or producing the good. This is a further non-
consequentialist feature connected with how the good is a conse-
quence. (I have already noted [p. 163] that although there is a sense in
which this puts the evil downstream from the good in the Loop Case,
this is not the crucial factor.)24 The evil* plays a part in justifying the
turning, and hence plays a part in there being an initial sufficient jus-
tification. But it plays a part by helping sustain the structural equiva-
lent in the face of new problems I produce; not by producing the structural
equivalent.
Consider by contrast the Tractor Case. In it the tractor threat exists
independent of the further causal consequences of turning the trolley.25
Given the existence of the two threats initially, we have no initial suf-
ficient justification for turning the trolley from its initial hit on the five.
For when we turn the trolley and abstract from any new problem for the five
thereby created, the five are still subject to a fatal threat. That is, the struc-
tural equivalent of the justifying good does not yet exist as a flip side
of turning the trolley. In the Tractor Case, the structural equivalent
depends, in part, on the causal effects for the five of the removal of the
trolley. This is because it is the moving and hitting of the one that causes
the tractor to stop from the direction of its initial hit. This, I believe, is
what underlies the intuition that turning in the Tractor Case is imper-
missible. (As it turns out, in the Tractor Case the ultimate justifying
good comes into being when the structural equivalent does, as no
further problems for its continuing existence are produced by what we
do. But this fact that our turning the trolley can lead to the justifying
good does not mean that we have an initial sufficient justification for
turning, for we lack the structural equivalent without the evil*.) When
some evil* is causally necessary for the structural equivalent that helps
provide an initial sufficient justification of that evil*, the structural
equivalent is produced by an evil* that is not already initially sufficiently
172 F. M. Kamm
justified. The evil* does not stand outside the structural equivalent of
good and merely prevent its being undone by consequences of our
intervention.
For the same reason that we may not turn in the Tractor Case, it
would be impermissible to turn the trolley away from five people each
of whom shortly was going to die of organ failure, even if we know [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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