Aurel Braun NATO Russia Relations in the Twenty First Century (2008)

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worth asking whether Russia merely aims to block deployment of the anti-missile
shield in the Czech Republic and Poland, or whether its ambitions go further to
undermining the Alliance as a whole.
Petro-diplomacy and outflanking NATO
There are certain indicators that suggest that Russia s regional ambitions are
growing significantly and somewhat alarmingly. Perhaps these are part of a
strongly assertive Russian world vision that has important domestic and foreign
policy implications. Lilia Shevtsova from the Carnegie Moscow Center, for
instance, has argued rather persuasively that behind Russia s new national idea,
Conclusion 189
there is something rather troubling.23 She contends that anti-Western ideology has
become an important factor that legitimizes the highly centralized state. 24 Putin,
moreover, gave further voice to Russian international assertiveness in July 2007
when he not only endorsed the Russian deep seabed mission of a week earlier
(which had planted a Russian titanium flag below the North Pole), but declared
that the mission should be central to Russia s contested claim to an enormous
1.2 million square kilometres of potentially energy rich Arctic seabed.25
Its use of petro-diplomacy, backed up with sanctions against Ukraine, Georgia,
and even against a client state like Belarus,26 shows that Moscow has not hesitated
to use energy, and even the suspension of travel and postal services, as a way to
bring states within the former Soviet space to heel. Russia has also worked to
preserve the CIS, despite Georgian, Ukrainian and Moldovan questions about the
organization s relevance. For instance, the Putin government held a meeting in
November 2006 to coincide with the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia. Then Russian
minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov, argued that in fact new areas of cooperation
were being developed.27
Further, Moscow has moved to strengthen its position in organizations where
its vast energy resources give it an advantage, including the Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development, GUAM, and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO).28 The SCO, where China is the other major partner, has
proven especially useful in light of Russian energy supplies to its neighbour and
the desire by both states to undercut, or at least, to become counterweights to
American global power.
It is in the Middle East though that in certain respects Moscow has tried to
outflank NATO most assiduously. The Kremlin has gone beyond mere criticism
of American involvement in Iraq (and of NATO in Afghanistan). Moscow has
acted in certain ways as a key protector of Iran. The Putin government has
not only repeatedly undercut American and NATO efforts to impose sanctions
on Tehran, but has sold the latter vast quantities of some of the most modern
weapons, including TOR-M1 anti-aircraft batteries.29 Moscow has also engaged in
intelligence cooperation with Tehran30 and has expressed an interest in cooperating
with Iran in controlling the international trade in natural gas. Russia has also
supplied Syria with highly advanced weapons (some of which were then transferred
to Hezbollah) and it has an intelligence agreement with Damascus.31 Moscow has
continued to sell very large quantities of advanced weapons to Syria (and Iran),
claiming that these are merely defensive. 32
True, Russian hesitation about completing the nuclear reactor that it has been
building in Iran at Bushehr creates some ambiguity as to Russian plans in the Middle
East,33 but its overall efforts over the past few years bear a closer resemblance to
old Soviet goals in the Middle East than to the more restricted aims of creating
some counterbalance to the US and of achieving greater commercial gain. If in fact
the changes in Russian foreign policy are aimed at undermining both the US and
NATO, then the prospects for security cooperation could well be endangered, and
particularly so if NATO itself is divided and ceases to be resilient.
190 A. Braun
Can NATO maintain its cohesion?
Despite the Alliance s remarkable longevity and impressive ability to adapt there
are signs that NATO could be vulnerable to Russian pressures. Further, in light of
Alliance difficulties, if Moscow is truly intent on undermining it, the Kremlin s
prospects of doing so, may grow. First, efforts to build effective cooperation
between NATO and the EU that could make the former more resilient are faltering.
Berlin Plus, the 2003 agreement that was meant to define how and when
European countries could employ NATO assets for EU purposes, is not working
out well either in Kosovo or in Afghanistan the two best testing grounds.34 Some
NATO allies, moreover, such as France, view NATO as an American tool and do
not seem to mind working with Russia to undermine the Alliance though this may
change somewhat with the new pro-American president, Nicolas Sarkozy.
Second, there are significant differences in threat perception, as noted, where the
eastern Alliance members, geographically close to Russia, are deeply concerned
about Moscow s intentions, would like to see Ukraine and Georgia in NATO as
soon as possible, and definitely want to have hard security guarantees from the US
within the Alliance. By contrast, as the Western Europeans become increasingly
dependent on Russian energy supplies, as Moscow continues to bypass Eastern
Europe with undersea oil and natural gas pipelines, the divisions on how to best
cooperate with Russia and how to create region-wide security are only likely to
grow, unless there are drastic changes in West European perceptions and/or in
Russian domestic and foreign policies. It is true, though, that NATO as a whole
voiced its strong disapproval of Moscow s decision to withdraw (nominally a
moratorium ) from the CFE.35
Third, even in areas where there is strong military cooperation among Alliance
members, as in Afghanistan, there are important differences in the levels of allied
member commitment that are creating significant strains.36 For example, multiple
restrictions on what their forces are allowed to do in Afghanistan by several
European states have not only caused considerable Alliance friction but have
considerably imperiled the effectiveness of the mission. If Afghanistan was meant
to be the successful demonstration of NATO Out-of-Area operations, its possible
failure (never mind the grave consequences in Afghanistan itself and in the Middle
East of seeing Taliban prevail) would be a terrible blow to NATO s credibility. It
would certainly embolden those elements within the Russian security services and
the military that harbor fantasies of a return to superpower status, and especially
at the expense of the Alliance.
Where do Russia and the Alliance go from here? The growing frictions between the
two and Russia s authoritarian turn and international assertiveness do not negate
the fact that both sides can still gain tremendously from cooperation, whether in
the fight against terrorism or in economic development. Nonetheless, the growing
divisions cannot be ignored and it would be imprudent to try to paper over
differences. Some cooperation, of course, is always possible, but the building of
lasting regional security requires the fostering a strong commonality of interests.
Russia s increasing authoritarian turn, aggressive petro-diplomacy, and apparent
Conclusion 191
efforts to undermine, or at least, to render less effective a vulnerable alliance,
then, does not bode well. Still, it may be premature to claim that there are clear
or irreversible trends in Russian domestic or foreign policies. Russia s oil-based
economy and energy-fueled foreign policy are themselves vulnerable and Moscow [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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