CWIHP Bulletin nr 14 15 part 5 Conference reports, research notes and archive updates

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reminiscing of the times when the PRC had supported Gomulka tion to US escalation in Vietnam lacked that kind of verve.
during the 1956 crisis. It was not until the 1970s, when eco- The emerging Sino-Soviet split, Luthi argued, prevented a
nomic issues took primacy, that relations between the two forceful reaction that might have deterred a greater American
parties warmed up again. commitment. Ideological differences per se did constitute the
The fourth panel discussed the origins and the first years major obstacle for aid to the DRV. One explanation to this
of the Sino-Soviet split. Chaired by Goldgeier, the panel fea- phenomenon, Luthi continued, lay in concurrent develop-
tured new findings from the Hungarian and East German ar- ments in Chinese domestic politics, in the run-up to and early
chives on the CCP s position regarding the Hungarian Revo- stages of Mao s Cultural Revolution. B�k�s presented an
lution. Hope Harrison (GWCW) discussed the position of overview of the Hungarian mediation attempt between the
the German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the emerging Sino- US and the North Vietnamese in 1965-66. Using evidence
Soviet split. Based on her research in the SED archives in uncovered by the Cold War Research Center-Hungary, it is
Berlin, the paper showed how the party found itself forced to clear that Hungary was not a negotiator or a mediator as
choose sides in the emerging conflict and attempted to use fraternal Poland or Romania. B�k�s went on to debunk ru-
the conflict between Moscow and Beijing to its own advan- mors that Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter ever went
tage, especially before the conflict burst into the open. V�mos to Vietnam in the fall of 1965 as a secret negotiator. Further-
continued his morning presentation with additional findings more, he continued, the Hungarian leadership felt offended
from the Hungarian archives on Sino-Hungarian relations by the North Vietnamese when they did not receive any grati-
from 1956 to 1972. The documents, he argued, while not pro- tude in return for their support. Hershberg (GWU) examined
viding any smoking guns, flesh out the history and details of new evidence on Poland s secret Vietnam diplomacy during
the relationship. Romanian historian Lavinea Betea, together Lyndon B. Johnson s 37-day bombing pause, from Decem-
with British historian Paul Wingrove, jointly presented a pa- ber 1965 to January 1966. Hershberg came to the conclusions
per dealing with the psychology of Romanian Communist that the Poles, and Foreign Ministry director-general Jerzy
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RESEARCH NOTES
Michalowski in particular, made a good-faith effort to relay Hungarian historian Bal�zs Szalontai offered his per-
and, to a considerable extent, advocate to Hanoi the Ameri- spective on The International Aspects of North Vietnamese
can proposal for talks. Nevertheless, like his Hungarian coun- Internal Policies, 1954-69. Caught between two competing
terpart Janos Peter, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki masters, Hanoi had to find ways to balance them. To exem-
was not beyond trying to mislead the Americans regarding plifying the point, Szalontai emphasized the North Vietnam-
Hanoi s position in order to prolong the pause. In doing so, ese dilemma on what kind of land reform to carry out in 1954:
Hershberg suggested, Rapacki undermined his own credibil- the Soviet or the Chinese model? A mixture of both perhaps
ity in ways that would rebound against him during a more leaning towards a Chinese model the Vietnamese solution
serious Polish initiative in late 1966 (codenamed Marigold was a compromise. Szalontai also discussed the importance
by Washington). The Poles, he went on to suggest, like the of the North Vietnamese leaders such as Le Duan, Le Duc
Hungarians, conducted their initiative not at Soviet instiga- Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Truong Chinh. The National Lib-
tion but in coordination with Moscow, in a manner carefully eration Front and the DRV government played, in their rela-
designed to fit the Kremlin s known policy preferences. When tions with the other Communist countries, set roles of good
their efforts failed to convert the temporary bombing pause cop - bad cop. While there was cooperation between the
into a permanent halt and a US-DRV negotiating process, the North and the South, Szalontai concluded that the NLF was
Poles (like the Soviets and Hungarians) blamed the Chinese far from being simply an appendage of Hanoi. The North
for either preventing Hanoi from accepting peace talks or at Vietnamese were more cruel and aggressive than the NLF in
least reinforcing the belligerent tendencies that precluded a their policies, and some within the North Vietnamese leader-
positive response to the pause. Nothing in the new East-bloc ship were willing to sacrifice the NLF and use them primarily
evidence has yet emerged to alter the view of most scholars to get the foot in the door. Commenting on the papers,
that a missed opportunity for peace during the pause did Lien-Hang Nguyen (Yale University) stressed the importance
not exist, Hershberg concluded. Preponderant forces on both of socialist allies for Vietnam and the ways the North Viet-
sides still hoped to achieve mutually incompatible objectives namese used them for different reasons: they used Poland
as a result of continued fighting, and tended to view any (and the International Commission of Supervision and Con-
tendencies toward compromise by the enemy as signs of trol) and to some extent Hungary, for peace initiatives, while
weakness justifying further military efforts rather than recip- they used Bulgaria for economic aid.
rocal concessions as steps toward peace. Chaired by Kathryn Weathersby (CWIHP), the eight
Chaired by Odd Arne Westad the next panel discussed panel dealt with Korea using a variety of approaches, sources,
not only foreign policy but also touched on the much less and methods. This attention afforded to North Korea dem-
discussed aspect of internal North Vietnamese policy making onstrated how the global Cold War was felt on the national
and the pressures on the North Vietnamese leaders during and local levels. Balazs Szalontai s 1956 A Challenge to
the Second Indochina War. Malgorzata Gnoinska (GWU), the Leader showed the complexity of the relationship be-
presented a paper titled Mieczyslaw Maneli and Polish At- tween the super-power and small powers by focusing on the
tempts to Neutralize Vietnam Rumors Revisited: Poland and unique political situation within Korea. Looking at intra-
Vietnam, 1963. In the fall of 1963, the CIA and the Western party politics, Szalontai explains how Kim Il Sung could re-
press alleged that Mieczyslaw Maneli, the Polish delegate to sist Khrushchev s calls for de-stalinization and reform. Simi-
the International Control Commission (ICC) set up in 1954 by larly, Sergey Radchenko s paper North Korea and Soviet/
the Geneva Conference, initiated a secret dialogue between Japanese Rapprochement in the 1960s and Bernd Sch�fer s
Saigon and Hanoi, a claim Maneli denied. Ever since, the North Korean Adventurism and China s Long Shadow,
episode has remained a matter of controversy and mystery. 1966-1972 emphasized regional interests and perspectives.
By using new evidence from the Polish archives, Gnoinska Both showed the significance of the regional perspective in
put forth some of the missing pieces to the forty-year-old the decisions made by North Korea and provide insights into
puzzle. The evidence, she argues, makes it clear that Maneli North Korea s historical behavior in international politics. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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