CWIHP Bulletin nr 4 part 2 Soviet espionage and the bomb

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make extensive use of the new Soviet docu-
from a political point of view it may be more
mentation are Odd Arne Westad, Prelude
beneficial for Nixon if the agreement with the GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we
to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Af-
USSR were to be achieved closer to the presiden- will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the
ghan Communists, 1978-1979, International
tial elections. According to a statement by the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to
History Review 16 (Feb. 1994), 49-69; and
American representative to the Disarmament many of us. Only one thing is clear we cannot
Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confron-
Committee in Geneva, the USA is ready to con- surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to
tation: American-Soviet Relations from
duct at least three more rounds (the present one think how to achieve this. Maybe we won t have
included) of negotiations, striving first of all to Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: to introduce troops.
get the agreement of the USSR on limitation of KOSYGIN. All of us agree we must not
Brookings Institution, 1994), 977-1075.)
strategic offensive weapons. surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have
The documents below offer some indica-
At the same time, not being sure that they to work out first of all a political document, to use
tion of the apprehension Soviet leaders felt
will manage to obtain the agreement of the USSR all political means in order to help the Afghan
about sending military forces in the spring of
on a complex accord on the limitation of ABM leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the
1979, as well as of the secretiveness sur-
systems and strategic offensive weapons on terms support which we ve already planned, and to
rounding the actual decision to intervene
acceptable to the U.S., the Americans might put
leave as a last resort the use of force....
when it was finally made. The first docu-
forward a proposal for partial agreement. Most
ments concern a visit to Moscow in March
probably it would be a proposal to limit ABM
Yet, on March 18, as the Politburo contin-
deployment to the Safeguard system for the 1979 by Afghan Prime Minister Nur
ued to deliberate, a consensus emerged, led
USA and an ABM system around Moscow for
Mohammad Taraki, whose communist
by KGB chairman Andropov, against direct
the USSR.
People s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
Soviet military intervention. Even Gromyko,
And if American attempts to obtain a sepa-
(PDPA) had come to power in the bloody
despite his admonition only a day before
rate, favorable to them, agreement on ABM
April 1978 coup or revolution (the term
that Afghanistan must not be surrendered,
systems fail, they would prefer just to conclude
depends on who tells the story) that over-
a treaty on measures for reducing the danger of gave an impassioned, indeed prescient warn-
threw the non-aligned Daoud government.
an outbreak of nuclear war between the USA and
ing against dispatching troops.
Since then, his regime had faced rising inter-
USSR.
nal opposition from Islamic activists who
CC CPSU is informed.
ANDROPOV. We know Lenin s teaching
resented the imposition of atheistic and mod-
about a revolutionary situation. Whatever type of
Head of the State Security Committee
ernistic ideas, from fiercely independent situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is
tribes who disliked increasing centraliza- not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that
[signature] ANDROPOV
we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only
tion, and, after the dissolution of a short-
with the aid of our bayonets, but that is for us
lived alliance, from the PDPA s own
(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 193, Ll. 33-
entirely inadmissable. We cannot take such a
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 71
DOCUMENTATION
risk.... of the CPSU, March 17 [and 18 and 19], 1979], I have already mentioned to you, your meeting
GROMYKO. I fully support Comrade Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi with L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.
Andropov s proposal to exclude a measure as the Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh At first we proposed that the first word
introduction of our troops into Afghanistan. The merakh [ On the Aggravation of the Situation in should be given to you, but since one important
[Afghan] army there is unreliable. Thus our the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and On question from your side has already been raised,
army if it enters Afghanistan will be an aggres- Our Possible Measures ], translations by Mark I would like to first set forth our opinion, and then
sor. Against whom will it fight? Against the H. Doctoroff, CWIHP; see also Garthoff, Detente we will attentively hear you out.
Afghan people first of all, and it will have to and Confrontation, rev. ed., pp. 992-93.) First of all, I would like to emphasize that the
shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly friendship between Soviet Union and the Demo-
noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is cratic Republic of Afghanistan is not conditional, [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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